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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction, having granted Petitioner's petition for 
writ of certiorari. Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(a). 
II. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews a decision by the Court of Appeals "for 
correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference." Oak Lane Homeowners Assn. v. 
Griffin, 2011 UT 25, f7. "The Supreme Court's review extends no further than to 
determine whether the court of appeals accurately reviewed the trial court's decision 
under the appropriate standard of review." State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 295 TJ15, 137 P.3d 
787, quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wong, 2005 UT 51, [^15, 122 P.3d 589. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Tom Watkins filed this action on July 1, 2005. Complaint, R.l. Watkins' 
principal cause of action against Henry Day Ford was for breach of contract. Although 
the Complaint included an alternative claim for specific performance, Watkins elected 
prior to trial to seek damages. 
2. Henry Day answered the Complaint on July 12, 2005. R.10. 
3. This case was tried to the Bench on March 3, 2009. Minutes of Bench Trial 
and record of exhibits offered and received, R. 564- 567. 
4. Subsequent to trial, the Court asked the parties to submit memoranda regarding 
a person's duty to speak on penalty that a person's silence might constitute waiver. 
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V\dtkni', lesponsi. in lliv lonn i'l ,i Irilu i t omul at R.567A. Henry Day's response is 
found at R.568. 
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with prejudice Watkins" claims and causes of action, and awarded I lenr)1 Da> attorneys 
fees in the sum *.; x> . . 
•-\T'\! !*\ the inai court. 
o. iiy an Opinion issued Scptembei ;•, 2ulu, ihe *~ourl of Appeals reversed the 
decision of the trial court, held that Henry Day had breached its contracts win- • w: . . 
and remanded the case ior a trial on damages. I lit < 'on I i »l \ppL-als held dial \\ .ilk MI 
1 ]
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Fnn I Motor Company uincilt il Ihe Ford G'140 concept car, which was based on the Ford 
GT40 that Ford had built and successfully raced in the mid -1.960's at I eMans. Watkins, 
Trial Transcript (hereafter "Tr ") 38:20-30-1* nnfi , see_aiso t . 
Exhm i i2 (copy attaci.eu ncici. . ^ w o 
, :> 
put the GT40 into production and that it would manufacture a limited number of the 
vehicles. Watkins, Tr. 39: 13-16; Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12 (at Addendum "B" 
hereto). Ford, at the time, did not indicate when the vehicles would be distributed to its 
dealerships. 
Tom Watkins, who owns a Volkswagen dealership, learned about the GT40 from 
reading reports of the Detroit Auto Show in various trade publications to which he 
subscribed. On learning of Ford's plan to put the GT40 concept car into production, 
Watkins inquired at numerous Ford dealerships, initially without success, in an effort to 
locate a dealer who might take his order for a GT40. Watkins, Tr. 41:18 - 43:14. 
About March 2, 2002, Watkins met with Steve Kersey, Henry Day Ford's 
Commercial Sales Manager. Watkins, Tr. 44:3; Kersey, Tr. 114:9-13. Watkins inquired if 
Henry Day Ford might be allocated any Ford GT40s and, if yes, would it sell him one? 
Watkins, Tr. 44:4-21. Kersey replied that Henry Day Ford might be allocated one, 
perhaps two GT40s, although it was not certain it would be allocated any. Kersey 
indicated that if Ford allocated and delivered to it any GT40s, it was willing to sell them 
to Watkins. Watkins, Tr. 46:6-13. 
Watkins knew that the concept car that Ford had introduced at Detroit still had to 
be put into production, and anticipated that it might be several years before the GT40 
would be available for sale to the public. Watkins, Tr. 40:13-18. As Ford had announced 
it planned a limited production run, Watkins understood that not every Ford dealer would 
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be allocated one or more Ford GT40s, and that Ford might not allocate any of the limited 
production vehicles to Henry Day Ford. Watkins, Tr. 45:15-18. Kersey and Watkins 
discussed that it might take two years or more before the GT40 would be delivered to 
dealers. Watkins, Tr. 45:24-46:5; see also Finding of Fact no. 18 (R.631), finding that: 
18. . . at the time the parties executed the Contracts, defendant was 
uncertain as to when or if it would receive the GT 40's. Plaintiff 
believed that at the time the Contracts were executed that it could 
take as long as two years for defendant to receive the Ford GT 40's. 
Watkins offered to purchase two Ford GT40s for manufacturer's suggested retail 
price ("MSRP"), should Ford later allocate and deliver such vehicles to Henry Day. 
Watkins also offered to pay Henry Day and it agreed to accept $1000 as a down payment 
toward the purchase of each vehicle. 
Henry Day prepared two written motor vehicle contracts of sale (the "Contracts") 
dated March 4, 2002. Each identified the vehicle that was the subject of the Contracts, as 
a new Ford GT40. One contract obligated Henry Ford to sell and Watkins to buy the "1 s t 
GT40 ordered by Henry Day Ford." The second obligated the parties to sell and buy the 
"2nd GT40 ordered by Henry Day Ford." The Contracts did not specify a model year for 
the vehicle or a delivery date, because neither party could be sure when Ford would begin 
delivery of the vehicles to its dealers. Each Contract specified a down payment in the 
amount of $ 1,000. Watkins signed both Contracts, as did Kersey. 
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Watkins, on March 4, 2002, gave Henry Day Ford a personal check for $2,000 
which was the amount of the down payments on which the parties agreed. Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 3. The next day the parties, consistent with their earlier discussion, amended their 
Contracts to include the words "purchase for MSRP." Watkins, Tr. 49: 12-50:18; Kersey, 
Tr. 112:19- 113:21; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 2. The Contracts did not, though, state a date 
on which the contract price would be due. 
Watkins, as of March 4, 2002, understood that Ford might not ever allocate any 
GT40s to Henry Day, in which case it would have none to sell to him. Watkins, Tr. 51:22-
25. Henry Day cautioned Watkins that it might not be allocated any Ford GT40s, in which 
case it would have none to sell to him. Kersey, Tr. I l l : 14-29. Kersey, though, believed 
that it was possible that Henry Day might be allocated the vehicle that Ford had 
announced as the GT40. Kersey, Tr. 111:14- 112:6. Watkins understood that if Ford 
Motor Co. did not ever allocate any of the vehicles to Henry Day, then Henry Day would 
have no duty to find for and sell to him a Ford GT40. Watkins, Tr. 52:1-3. 
By letter dated December 31, 2002, Henry Day Ford advised Watkins that. "We 
regret to inform you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this 
vehicle." Emphasis added; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4 and Addendum "A" hereto. 
Enclosed with the letter was a check payable to Watkins in the amount of $2000. There 
was no restrictive indorsement on the check. Believing Henry Day's representation that it 
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would not be receiving the vehicles identified by the Contracts, Watkins negotiated the 
check. Watkins, Tr. 52:15-53:8. 
Henry Day did not ask that Watkins release it of its contractual obligation, subject 
to the condition precedent it and Watkins had identified. Watkins did not agree to release 
Henry Day of its obligation, although he did believe based on Henry Day's representation 
that it would not be receiving any Ford GT40s. 
Having been told by Henry Day that it would not be receiving any of the vehicles 
he had agreed to buy if Henry Day Ford was allocated any, Watkins renewed his search, 
calling multiple Ford dealers in Utah and outside Utah. He found no one, however, who 
was willing to sell himaGT40. Watkins, Tr. 53:13- 54:1. 
Sometime between January 2002 and the Fall of 2004, when the model went into 
production and deliveries began to dealers, Ford Motor Co. shortened the name of the 
model it had introduced at Detroit as the GT40 to, simply, the "GT." See Henry Day's 
Trial Exhibit 12, copy attached hereto at Addendum "B." Although now referred to as the 
"GT," it was the same vehicle that Ford had introduced in early 2002 as the "GT40". Id.; 
see also Kersey testimony, Tr. 112:14-18. The first production model delivered to 
selected dealers, who included Henry Day Ford, was the 2005 Ford GT. 
Henry Day's December 31, 2002 representation to Watkins that "our allocation is 
not going to allow us to receive the vehicle" turned out not to be true. Ford Motor Co. 
allocated the limited number of Ford GTs it produced to dealers who won certain awards. 
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Even at the time Henry Day delivered its letter to Watkins, Henry Day knew that it was 
possible that it could be allocated what was then still known as the GT40 if it won one of 
the awards. Day, Tr. 148-149. Henry Day maintained at trial that it had thought it 
unlikely that it would win any awards. Notwithstanding its professed pessimism, Henry 
Day received the "Presidents Award," awarded by Ford for calendar years 2003 and 2004. 
It also earned Ford's "Share of the Nation" award, based on its sales performance in 
2003. As a consequence of Henry Day earning these multiple awards, Ford allocated and 
delivered to Henry Day three Ford GTs. 
Ford Motor Co. invoiced Henry Day for a white 2005 Ford GT Coupe about 
December 9, 2004, which it later delivered to Henry Day. MSRP for the vehicle was set 
by Ford at $156,595. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 12. According to Henry Day, it received 
delivery of the white GT on May 31, 2005. Findings of Fact 31, 32. Henry Day did not 
disclose to Watkins its allocation or receipt of the white GT coupe. Instead, Henry Day's 
owner, Mike Day, kept it for his personal use. 
Ford allocated to Henry Day a second Ford GT about May 31, 2005 - a red 2005 
Ford GT Coupe. MSRP was set by Ford at $156,945. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 13. The 
second GT was delivered to Henry Day during or after July, 2005. Findings of Fact 33, 
34. 
On June 8, 2005, one of Watkins' employees mentioned to Watkins that she had 
heard that Henry Day had received two Ford GTs. Watkins, Tr. 54:18 - 55:4. Until then, 
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Watkins did not know that Ford Motor Co. had allocated and delivered to Henry Day any 
Ford GTs. Tr. 55:5-14. Watkins went immediately to Henry Day Ford, insisted that 
Henry Day fulfill its obligations under the Contracts and sell him two Ford GTs for 
MSRP. LI Watkins offered to write a check for the Ford GTs at MSRP. Henry Day 
refused Watkins' tender and refused to sell him either of the two vehicles it had been 
allocated, informing Watkins that their Contracts were no longer valid. Watkins, Tr. 56: 
1-13. It did, though, offer to sell him the white Ford GT if Watkins would pay $250,000 
instead of MSRP. Watkins, Tr. 58:2- 59:10; 100: 6-11. 
Watkins filed this action soon after Henry Day rejected his tender of MSRP for the 
two vehicles. Henry Day subsequently sold the red 2005 Ford GT to a car dealer in 
Washington, for $206,000. Day, Tr. 130:20 - 131:22; 136:18-25. Only sometime after this 
action was filed, and the market value of Ford GTs had dropped significantly, did Henry 
Day offer to sell to Watkins the third GT it had received, for MSRP. Watkins declined the 
offer and maintained his suit for breach of contract. 
V. NATURE OF THE PARTIES9 CONTRACTS 
The promise by Henry Day Ford to sell Watkins one, possibly two, Ford GT40s, or 
"GT" as the vehicle was later called, was subject to a condition precedent: that being 
Ford Motor Company's non-guaranteed future allocation to Henry Day of one or two 
Ford GTs once the model went into production. A condition precedent "calls for the 
performance of some act on the happening of some event after a contract is entered 
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into and upon the performance or happening of which its obligations are made to 
depend." Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah App. 1993) 
(emphasis added); Associated Inv. Co. v. Cavias. 55 Utah 377, 185 P. 778, 779 (1919); 
see also McBride-Williams v. Huard, 2004 UT 21, |13 . "Whether a promise is 
conditional depends upon the parties' intent, which is derived from a fair and 
reasonable construction of the language used in light of all the circumstances when 
the parties executed the contract." Commercial Union, 38 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the parties clearly intended the Contracts for the sale and 
purchase of one or more Ford GTs to be subject to a condition precedent. Jeremy Day 
told Steve Kersey to tell Watkins that it was not an SVT dealer and that it might not be 
allocated any GT40s, but if it did it would sell them to Watkins. Watkins likewise 
understood that Henry Day Ford might not be allocated any of Ford's newly announced 
sports car, but if it did Watkins agreed to purchase up to two at MSRP. 
This case is, in some respects, similar to Koenen v. Royal Buick Co., 162 Ariz. 
376, 783 P.2d 822 (Ariz. App. 1989). Koenen involved a buyer's quest to purchase a 
Buick GNX, a limited edition vehicle. The Buick GNX was the fastest limited production 
car in the United States at the time, and Buick made only 500. Koenen approached Royal 
Buick before the dealership knew if it would be allocated any GNX's and said he wanted 
to buy one. Royal agreed to sell Koenen a GNX for MSRP, which Koenen agreed to pay. 
The parties signed a purchase order. Royal took orders from three different people for 
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GNX's. Later, Buick informed Royal it would be allocated one. In characterizing the 
nature of the contract between Koenen and Royal, the court held that Royal's contractual 
duty to sell Koenen a Buick GNX was subject to a condition precedent; that being 
Buick's allocation to it of a GNX. Koenen, 183 P.2d 827 n.5. According to the Arizona 
Court of Appeals: 
Koenen suggests that the only question as to availability was whether 
Royal Buick would receive a GNX automobile to sell to Koenen. 
We agree that this is the only reasonable interpretation to be placed 
upon this term contained in the purchase order. The receipt of the GNX 
then becomes a condition to Royal Buick's duty to perform. 
Koenen, 783 P. 2d 827 (emphasis added). The court of appeals agreed with the trial 
court, which had "concluded that had Royal Buick not received a GNX, no breach of 
contract would have occurred." Id., n.5. On receipt of a GNX and realization of the 
condition precedent, though, Royal had a contractual obligation to sell to Koenen the 
GNX it had been allocated, and which it received, for MSRP. 
Performance of a duty, or promise to perform subject to a condition precedent 
becomes due only if the condition occurs. Had Ford Motor Co. not ever allocated any 
Ford GTs to Henry Day, it would have had no obligation to sell any to Watkins. Looking 
beyond the "four corners" of the parties' Contracts, the trial court's findings of fact 
recognized the conditional nature of the parties' agreement, finding that: 
Though defendant did not have any GT 40's on its lot, nor did the 
dealership know if it would be allocated any GT 40's to sell, at that 
time Mr. Kersey was given permission to enter into a contract(s) 
to sell plaintiff Ford GT40 automobiles, if such vehicles were allotted 
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to defendant. 
Finding of Fact no. 8 ( R.630); see also Findings of Fact nos. 9 (R.630) (". . . defendant 
would sell the plaintiff two (2) GT40 automobiles if defendant was allocated the 
vehicles"); and 18 ( R.632) (finding that, "at the time the parties executed the contracts, 
defendant was uncertain as to when or if it would receive the Ford GT40s . . ."). 
Henry Day's contractual obligation to sell to Watkins one or more Ford GTs came 
into existence the moment Ford Motor Co. allocated to Henry Day the first Ford GT, 
assuming (1) that that was the vehicle for which the parties had contracted and (2) that 
Watkins had not waived his right to purchase it. 
The conditional nature of Watkins5 and Henry Day's Contracts, in which the 
obligation to sell and the obligation to buy up to two GT40's depended on Ford Motor 
Company allocating one or more of the vehicles to Henry Day, bears especially on Henry 
Day's defenses of waiver and abandonment. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the law and was correct holding that the 
trial court was permitted to, and should have considered extrinsic evidence in determining 
what the parties meant by their reference to "GT40" in the contracts they signed in March 
2002, and in overruling the trial court's conclusions of law to the contrary. It was also 
correct in holding that Ford Motor Company's change of name of the vehicle it had 
introduced in early 2002 as the "GT40," to "GT", created a "latent ambiguity" that 
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warranted the courts' consideration of extrinsic evidence - including Ford's renaming of 
the vehicle- to determine what the parties meant by their reference to "GT40" in their 
Contracts. Although the Contracts included an integration clause, the existence of an 
integration clause does not preclude a court from considering extrinsic evidence in order 
to determine if there exists a latent ambiguity, or what the parties meant by their use of 
the words in the contract. The Court of Appeals was correct in determining that the GTs 
that Henry Day received were the same vehicle and model that the parties had identified 
in their contracts, the only difference being that Ford had changed the name of the model 
from "GT40" to "GT." 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the law and was correct in determining, 
based on the evidence as marshaled, that the evidence clearly preponderated against the 
trial court's findings that Watkins had abandoned or waived his contractual rights. It was 
correct in concluding that Henry Day had failed to prove that Watkins, by his conduct, 
had intentionally relinquished a contractual right that he understood and knew he still had 
- especially given Henry Day's unequivocal statement by letter dated December 31, 2002 
that Ford Motor Company would not be allocating to it any GT40s. Additionally, Henry 
Day may not claim waiver where its false representation was the basis of the waiver. It 
cannot claim waiver based on Watkins' alleged silence for 2 Vi years, where Watkins had 
no right to demand Henry Day's performance until Ford Motor Co. allocated to it one or 
more Ford GTs. The Court of Appeals' holding furthermore can be affirmed on the basis 
-12-
that Henry Day did not attempt to prove that it was prejudiced by Watkins' alleged waiver. 
Given its construction of the parties' contracts and its conclusion that Watkins did 
not by his conduct waive or abandon a contract right that was known to him to still exist, 
the Court of Appeals correctly held that Henry Day breached its Contracts. It was 
therefore correct to remand the case for a trial on damages, and a determination of 
attorneys fees which Watkins is entitled to recover. 
The record on failure to mitigate damages is incomplete, and in fact the trial court 
did not reach the issue of damages. Its finding on failure to mitigate damages was 
therefore premature. Its conclusion was also wrong, in that a party's failure to accept a 
settlement offer cannot be the basis for failure to mitigate damages. The Court of Appeals 
did not err, though, in remanding the issue for trial to develop a better record on the issue. 
VII. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT ON CERTIORARI 
A. The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in its Interpretation of the Parties9 
Contracts 
Juliet says to Romeo in the famous Shakespearean play: 
What's in a name? 
That which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet. 
William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet. 
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What is in a name? That is the question. 
On March 4, 2002, Tom Watkins and Henry Day Ford entered into two written 
Contracts: one for the "first GT40 ordered by Henry Day Ford;" another for the "second 
GT40 ordered by Henry Day Ford." Both Contracts identified the motor vehicle covered 
by the Contracts to be a new Ford GT40, but did not identify the model year or vehicle 
identification numbers. 
Ford Motor Company had recently unveiled at the North American Auto Show in 
Detroit a concept car that it, at the time, identified as the "GT40." Ford announced plans 
to put the GT40 into production, to be delivered to its dealers hopefully in time for the 
company's centennial. Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 12 (Addendum B hereto). 
Watkins testified at trial that the vehicle he had agreed to buy, when he signed the 
Contracts, was "the car known at the time as the Ford GT40 and the car that Mr. Kersey 
and I both described at the time as being the Ford GT40." Tr. 72:9-13. Watkins and 
Kersey used the term "GT40" to identify the vehicle that was the subject of their 
Contracts, "because that was its name at the time." Watkins, Tr. 47:9-13. 
Sometime between March 4, 2002 and the start of Ford's distribution of the 
vehicles to its dealers, Ford Motor Co. renamed the vehicle, "GT." See Henry Day 
Ford's Trial Exhibit 12. Notwithstanding Henry Day's prior representation to Watkins 
that Ford Motor Co. would not be allocating to it any GT40s, Ford Motor Co., in late 
2004, allocated to Henry Day a white 2005 Ford GT Coupe, which it delivered to Henry 
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Day on May 31, 2005. Ford Motor Co. allocated to Henry Day a second Ford GT Couple, 
also a 2005 model, for which it invoiced Henry Day on May 31, 2005. Later, Ford 
Motor Co. allocated and shipped to Henry Day a third GT, a 2006 Ford GT Coupe. 
Henry Day knew and understood that the GTs it received were the same model that 
Ford Motor Co. had initially introduced as the Ford GT40, as evidenced by the testimony 
of its managers at trial. Steve Kersey testified that he understood the Ford GT was 
the same vehicle that he, in preparing the Contracts, had identified as the Ford 
GT40. 
Q. [by Watkins' attorney]: Now you understood that 
the automobiles that were the subject of these 
contracts was the yet to be produced Ford GT 
concept car or the GT40 as it was called at that 
time, correct? 
A. [Kersey]: Yes. 
Tr. 112:14-18. The Court of Appeals interpreted this admission as unequivocal testimony 
that Kersey "shared Watkins' understanding regarding the model of the car being 
discussed." Watkins, ]fl4. In addition, Jeremy Day, a co-owner and general manager of 
Henry Day Ford,1 reluctantly conceded that the Ford GT was the same vehicle that Ford 
Motor Company had initially introduced as the Ford GT40: 
]Tr. 122: 7-16 
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Q. [by Watkins' attorney]: As of the date of that letter, 
December 312, you knew that dealers winning those 
awards3 would qualify for cars. 
A. [Day]: What I knew is that's what our zone rep had 
told me, yes. It was - it was - 1 would not receive a 
GT 40, but if we won one of these two awards, we 
could receive the GT. 
Q. The GT had earlier been introduced as the GT 40, had 
it not? 
A. I'm not sure. I mean, I didn't - 1 didn't watch the trade 
shows or whatnot. I believe so. I think evidence says 
that it was, yes. 
Tr.l26:25-127:9. 
Notwithstanding Kersey's and Day's trial testimony that the GT40 and GT were 
the same vehicle model, and notwithstanding the 2003 Ford Motor Company Bulletin 
(Defendant's Exhibit 12) that describes the transition of the vehicle from "GT40" to 
"GT,"4 Henry Day disingenuously argued at trial and to the Court of Appeals that it could 
not have breached its Contracts with Watkins because Ford Motor Company did not ever 
allocate and deliver to it a Ford GT40. The three vehicles it received, in recognition of 
2
 Question refers to Henry Day's letter to Tom Watkins dated December 31, 2002, 
in which Henry Day informed Watkins that "our allocation is not going to allow us to 
receive this vehicle." Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4. 
3The "President's Award" and the "Share of the Nation Award." Transcript, 
124:14-125:15; 126:14-18. See also Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 7-9. 
4Defendant Henry Day Ford's Trial Exhibit 12 is a Ford Motor Company Bulletin 
dated June 2003. The bulletin is entitled, "From Concept to Production: GT40 to 
GT." Addendum B. 
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the awards it won, it said, were "GTs," not "GT40s"; and it had no contractual obligation 
to sell Watkins a "GT." 
Henry Day vigorously argued at trial and on the appeal below for a strict 
application of the parol evidence rule, contending that the trial court and the court of 
appeals had to determine the meaning of "GT40," as used in the Contracts, solely by 
reference to the words within the "four corners" of the Contracts. On appeal, it argued 
that the two Contracts are "undisputedly clear and unambiguous and were intended to be 
a final and complete expression of the parties' bargain." Appellee's Brief, 13. Neither 
the trial court nor the Court of Appeals, Henry Day insisted, could consider any extrinsic 
evidence - i.e., any evidence outside the language of the contract, to construe the meaning 
of"GT40." 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court was able to and should have 
considered extrinsic evidence in construing the term "GT40" and that it erred when it 
concluded, under the circumstances, (1) that it was "required to interpret the parties' 
contracts" based upon the "plain meaning" of the words used in the Contracts; (2) that the 
"GTs" allocated to Henry Day Ford were a model of vehicle other than that identified in 
Watkins' and Henry Day's Contracts as a "GT40"; and (3) that Henry Day therefore did 
not breach the Contracts. Having just quoted Kersey's testimony wherein he 
acknowledged that the GT was the same vehicle that Ford had introduced as the GT40, 
Tr. 126:25-127:9, Watkins. f 14, the Court of Appeals concluded: 
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The evidence of the circumstances surrounding the contract 
formation and the situation of the parties at the time of 
contract formation does not indicate any other understanding 
on the part of either party. And the understanding that the use 
of the term GT40 referenced the newly-announced street-legal 
version of the GT40 is certainly supported by the language of 
the contracts. When the parties chose the term GT40, it was 
unambiguous and meant just that - the parties were 
contracting for the sale of what was then known as the GT40. 
Thus, the use of the term GT40 does not render the contracts 
facially ambiguous just because the car model ultimately 
produced was named simply the GT. 
Watkins, fl4. 
Ford Motor Company's subsequent change of name from "GT40" to "GT," 
according to the Court of Appeals, created a "latent ambiguity" concerning the parties' 
prior use of the term of "GT40" in their Contracts. According to the Court of Appeals, "a 
latent ambiguity" is one that "does not readily appear in the language of a document, but 
instead arises from a collateral matter when the document's terms are applied or 
executed." Watkins, [^15. The Court of Appeals continued, "extrinsic evidence, parol or 
otherwise, is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a writing" and that a "court may 
receive evidence of such surrounding facts as will enable it to look upon the transaction 
through the eyes of the parties thereto and thereby know what they understood or intended 
the ambiguous word or provisions to mean." Watkins, f 15 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. 
Qgden Theatre Co., 82 Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294, 296 (1932). With the benefit of the 
extrinsic evidence before it, the Court of Appeals held: 
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We determine that there is a latent ambiguity in the contracts 
at issue here, created by Ford's later decision to name the 
anticipated car the GT instead of the GT40. We thus look to 
the same evidence of surrounding circumstances as we did 
above to determine what car the parties intended to buy and 
sell. Again, it is clear that the parties meant the same thing 
with their reference to the GT40. And thus, taking the 
contract term GT40 to reference this car of a slightly different 
name accomplishes the concordant intent that the parties had 
when contracting, that is, it provides for the sale of two of the 
cars that Ford announced and produced on the heels of the 
GT40 concept car that was unveiled at the 2002 auto show. 
Because Henry Day received three such cars and did not sell 
two to Watkins for MSRP, Henry Day breached the contracts 
- assuming they had not been abandoned and that Watkins 
had not waived his rights thereunder. 
Watkins416. 
On certiorari, Henry Day again argues that any court interpreting the Watkins-
Henry Day Ford contracts must construe what the parties meant by their use of the term 
"GT40" by reference only to the language used in the Contracts, without resort to or 
consideration of any extrinsic evidence presented to the trial court. Henry Day stridently 
continues to argue that "GT40" is a clear and unambiguous term and that "GT40" does 
not mean "GT." Henry Day also argues that the inclusion of an integration clause in the 
Contracts bars reference to extrinsic evidence. As Henry Day did not receive delivery of 
a "GT40," it contends it did not breach its Contracts with Watkins. 
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Watkins responds as follows to Henry Day Ford's argument. 
1. The meaning of words used in a contract, and whether the words used 
are or are not ambiguous, cannot always be determined solely by reference to words 
"within the four corners" of the contract. 
Corbin, in his treatise on contracts, strongly criticizes the notion that the meaning 
of all terms in a contract can be divined by looking only to language "within the four 
corners" of a contract. According to Corbin: 
Words and acts are merely symbols of expression. No person can 
determine the meaning of written words merely by gluing his or her 
eyes within the four corners of a square paper. It is human beings who 
give meanings to words, and words in themselves have no meaning. When a 
judge refuses to consider relevant extrinsic evidence on the ground that the 
meaning of stated words is plain and clear, that decision is formed by and 
wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence of the judge's own 
personal education and experience. 
5 Corbin on Contracts, § 24.7 at 39 (1998) (emphasis added). The eminent jurist Oliver 
Wendell Holmes expressed a similar sentiment, when he observed in the course of a 1917 
case: 
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in color or content according to the 
circumstances and time in which it is used. 
Towne v. Eisner. 38 S.Ct. 158, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 62 L.Ed. 372 (1917). 
The Oregon Supreme Court, in a 1932 case, observed that: 
The flexibility of or multiplicity in the meaning of words is the principal 
source of difficulty in the interpretation of language. Words are the conduits 
by which thoughts are communicated, yet scarcely any of them have such a 
fixed and single meaning that they are incapable of denoting more than one 
thought... it is said that a court in construing the language of the parties 
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must put itself into the shoes of the parties. That alone would not suffice; it 
must also adopt their vernacular. 
Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co.. 141 Ore. 306, 16 P.2d 627 (1932). 
2. Utah has adopted Corbin's reasoning and has rejected a strict application 
of the parol evidence rule and related rules of contract construction. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assn., 907 P.2d 264 
(Utah 1995), embraced Corbin's reasoning when it held that: 
When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant 
evidence must be considered. Otherwise, a determination of ambiguity is 
inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the "extrinsic evidence of 
the judge's own linguistic education and experience." 
Ward, 268 (emphasis added) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Drayage & 
Rigging Co.. 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 643, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (Cal. 1968) (quoting 
Corbin § 579, at 225 n.5 (Supp. 1964)). According to the Utah Supreme Court in Ward, 
"Rational interpretation of [contract terms] requires at least a preliminary consideration of 
all credible evidence to prove the intention of the parties . . . so that the court can place 
itself in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time of 
contracting." Ward, 268, quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 645. In embracing 
Corbin's reasoning, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that, "While there is Utah 
case law that espouses a stricter application of the rule and would restrict determination 
of whether ambiguity exists to a judge's determination of the meaning of the terms of the 
writing itself, the better reasoned approach is to consider the writing in light of the 
surrounding circumstances." Ward, 268 (emphasis added). 
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Subsequent Utah cases, or at least one line of Utah cases, acknowledge the holding 
in Ward as the "better reasoned approach." These cases hold that the determination of 
whether terms in a contract are or are not ambiguous, is not, as Henry Day contends on 
appeal, restricted or limited to an examination of only those terms and words within the 
four corners of a written document. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, 48 P.3d 
918, 919; Nielson v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 78 P.3d 600, 601; Gillmor v. Macev, 2005 
UT App 351, ffl[34, 35, 121 P.3d 57; cert, denied, 126 P.3d 772 (Utah 2005); The 
Cantamar, L.L.C. v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, fflf 26-29, 142 P.3d 140; Daines v. 
Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269. According to Peterson, "In determining whether a 
contract is ambiguous, the court is not bound to consider only the language of the 
contract." 48 P.3d 918, 919. In Gillmor, the Utah Court of Appeals observed that: 
Utah case law has rejected the strict application of the 'four corners5 rule, 
which limits the boundaries of inquiry into whether an ambiguity exists in a 
contract to the contract's "four corners" and effectively excludes evidence 
of any surrounding circumstances - - outside the writing - - that might 
indicate that the contract language lacks the required degree of clarity. 
* * * 
Likewise, Utah no longer strictly applies the "parol evidence rule" or the 
"plain meaning rule," which exclude the use of any parol evidence to show 
whether a contract's language lacks the required degree of clarity. 
* * * 
Instead, Utah law has made these rules of interpretation just part of the 
initial inquiry to determine whether an ambiguity exists in contract 
language. They are no longer the determinative rules they once were . . . 
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Gillmor, ^35 n.14 (citations omitted); see also Cantamar, ^26 n.5. 
The Court of Appeals, in Gillmor, acknowledged that line of Utah cases which 
hold that "if the language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous," that 
courts "'first look to the four comers of the agreement to determine the intentions of the 
parties . . .' from the plain meaning of the contractual language." Gillmor, %34 (quoting 
from Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, Tfl2, 40 P.3d 599). 
Notwithstanding the pronouncements in similar such cases, the Utah Court of Appeals, in 
Gillmor, consistent with Ward and Dames, stated that: 
However, Utah law does not strictly require courts to only view the terms of 
a contract within its four corners, according to their plain meaning, when 
making a determination of whether there is an ambiguity in a contract. 
Under Utah law, if the initial review of the plain language of the contract, 
within its four comers, reveals no patently obvious ambiguities, the inquiry 
into whether an ambiguity exists in a contract does not always end there. 
Utah's rules of contract interpretation allow courts to consider any relevant 
evidence to determine whether a latent ambiguity exists in contract terms 
that otherwise appear to be unambiguous. 
Gillmor, U1P4, 35 (emphasis in original). According to Ward, "when determining whether 
a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered." Ward, 907 P.2d at 
268 (emphasis added). A proffered interpretation of a contractual term, by reference to 
extrinsic evidence, must nonetheless be "tenable." Gillmor, p 7 n. 15. According to 
Daines, it "must be plausible and reasonable in light of the language used." Daines, f31. 
Even terms which purport to identify the subject matter of the contract may be 
ambiguous. In such cases, courts in Utah have permitted the consideration of extrinsic 
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evidence outside the "four corners of the contract" in order to determine the meaning of 
such terms. See e.g.. Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Board, 2008 UT 3, 
^13-16, 178 P.3d 886 (resort to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intended 
meaning of the term "surplus property"); Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 29 (resort to 
extrinsic evidence to determine what was meant by reference in a divorce decree to 
husband's "IBEW pension," in which wife was given a half interest). 
The Gillmor case provides a good example of where language in a contract, 
seemingly unambiguous on its face, was, when considered within the context of the 
parties' agreement at the time they made it and under the circumstances at the time, 
determined to be ambiguous. At issue in Gillmor was a written easement, in which the 
owners of one piece of property had previously bargained for the right to use their 
neighbor's property to access their own. The easement, however, provided that, "Gillmor 
agrees that he will not allow the use of and will not himself use any three-wheeled 
motorized All Terrain Vehicles or any two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized 'dirt bikes' 
on the Easements at anytime." Gillmor, ]f4. Approximately 15 years later, the Maceys, 
who had purchased part of the servient estate, stopped a Gillmor descendant who was 
crossing their property while riding a four-wheeled ATV, and told him he could not do so. 
A civil action ensued in which the trial court was asked to determine if the reference in 
the easement to "three-wheeled motorized ATV vehicles," "two-wheeled motorcycles," 
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and "motorized dirt bikes" meant that the Gillmors and their guests could not cross the 
Maceys' property on four-wheeled AT Vs. 
The Gillmors' argument to the trial court was much like that that Henry Day Ford 
makes in this case: 4 wheels is not 3 wheels. The language used in the easement was 
clear, said the Gillmors, in that it expressly prohibited them from crossing their 
neighbor's property on three-wheeled ATV's, two-wheeled motorcycles, and two-
wheeled dirt bikes. But it did not prohibit them from crossing on four-wheeled AT Vs. 
The restrictions, argued the Gillmors, were clear on their face and not ambiguous; and the 
easement clearly did not proscribe the Gillmors' use of ATVs with four or more wheels. 
Id., Tfl2, 32-33. The Court of Appeals conceded, 
Admittedly, when viewed in isolation, the Agreement's plain language 
would seem to lead to the conclusion that the terms "two-wheeled 
motorcycles or motorized 'dirt bikes'" and "three-wheeled motorized All 
Terrain Vehicles" are not at all ambiguous. On its face, the Agreement 
appears only to limit the use of "two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized 
'dirt bikes'" and "three-wheeled motorized All Terrain Vehicles" on the 
easements; it says nothing of four-wheeled ATVs." 
Gillmor, f34. The Court of Appeals explained, "nonetheless, by considering evidence of 
the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Agreement in 1985 [which it concluded 
was proper], it becomes clear that the Agreement is ambiguous as concerns the use of 
four-wheeled ATVs on the easements." Id, 1(36. The trial court and Court of Appeals 
noted that in 1985 four-wheeled ATVs were new and novel, and the court record 
indicated that the parties who negotiated the conditions attached to the use of the 
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easements, were at the time not aware that four-wheeled ATVs existed. The trial court 
furthermore received and considered evidence that the Maceys5 predecessor had sought to 
prohibit the Gillmors5 use of motorcycles, dirt bikes, and three-wheeled ATVs out of a 
concern regarding the noise and dust they caused. Id, f37. The Court of Appeals agreed 
that the Maceys' argument that the language in the easement barred the use of four-
wheeled ATVs was tenable, plausible and consistent with the terms used in the easement; 
as was the Gillmors' interpretation, which they based on the "plain meaning55 of the words 
used in the easement. The Court of Appeals, in the end, affirmed the decision of the trial 
court which had, first, based on extrinsic evidence, determined that the terms used in the 
easement, while seemingly unambiguous on their face, were in fact ambiguous; and 
second, had determined that the parties had by their use of the pertinent language intended 
to proscribe the use of a class of vehicles including motorcycles, dirt bikes, and three-
wheeled ATVs that, without reference to the exact number of wheels they had, were noisy 
and stirred up dust. Id., ^[37-42. Accordingly, the trial court held, based on its 
consideration of extrinsic evidence to help it determine the parties5 intentions, that the 
easement barred the Gillmors from crossing the Macey property on four-wheeled ATVs. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. 
The fact that Ford sometime between early 2002 and late 2004 shortened the 
designation of the vehicle that Watkins contracted to buy, from "GT4055 to "GT,55 does not 
mean that the "GT,55 as the model had now come to be known, was a model other than 
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and distinct from the vehicle/model that Henry Day Ford had agreed to sell to Watkins. 
See Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12, at Addendum "A" hereto. The name change of the 
model from "GT40" to "GT" does not and did not negate Henry Day Ford's contractual 
obligation to Watkins. 
Assume, hypothetically, that two thoroughbred horse breeders, A and B, agree, in 
writing, that A will buy from B, for $100,000, a two year old stallion named Alpha, if B 
should be able to aquire Alpha from C anytime within the next three years. C changes 
Alpha's name to Beta, re-registers the stallion as "Beta," then, within two years of the 
date of A's and B's contract, sells "Beta" to B. Can B then refuse to sell "Beta" to A on 
the ground that their contract obligated B to sell the horse to A only if he, with three years 
after their contract, was able to acquire a stallion named "Alpha"? Watkins presumes this 
court would agree that B's obligation to sell the stallion now named Beta would remain, 
and that B could not refuse to sell the horse to A on A's tender to B of $100,000. The 
argument that Henry Day Ford makes, and the distinction it tries to draw between "GT40" 
and "GT" is no different. "GT40" and "GT," like "Alpha" and "Beta," is the same horse. 
In the context of the Alpha/Beta hypothetical, however, the parties' written 
contract, if interpreted in accordance with reference to only the words contained within 
the "four corners" of the contract, would appear to be unambiguous: the parties' 
agreement concerned the conditional future sale and purchase of a horse named "Alpha"; 
and as "Beta" is not "Alpha" then "obviously" B would have no obligation to sell "Beta" 
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to A. Only by considering extrinsic evidence of what A and B meant by their reference to 
"Alpha," could the parties' intent and the subject matter of their agreement be correctly 
determined. The hypothetical reveals the peril in attempting to discern the ambiguity or 
meaning of words in a contract solely by reference to words with the four corners of the 
contract. 
3. The Court of Appeals did not err in its explanation and application of 
latent ambiguity to the facts of this case. 
Watkins, admittedly, approached the issue of contract interpretation in a slightly 
different manner than did the Court of Appeals. Watkins, on appeal, argued that 
extrinsic evidence was admissible to show that the parties, by their use of the term 
"GT40" in their Contracts, meant the concept car that Ford had just introduced as the 
"GT40" at the Detroit auto show, and had announced it planned to put it into production. 
In Watkins' view, "GT40" was more than just "a name," but was and referred the vehicle 
that Ford said it was going to put into production and make available for sale to the public 
sometime in the next several years. 
In the Court of Appeal's view, "When the parties chose the term GT40, it was 
unambiguous and meant just that - the parties were contracting for the sale of what was 
then known as the GT40." Watkins, f 14. The Court of Appeals concluded that the 
ambiguity concerning the meaning of "GT40" developed later, and was caused by "Ford's 
later decision to name the anticipated car the GT instead of the GT40." Watkins, }^16. 
Ford's renaming of the vehicle, see Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12, created a latent 
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ambiguity that warranted resort to extrinsic evidence when Watkins, in 2005, demanded 
performance, in order to determine what the parties had meant by their reference to 
"GT40" in their Contracts. Watkins. ffl[15, 16. 
Judge Posner, in Knutson v. UGS Corp.. 526 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir., 2008), 
explained the difference between "patent" and "latent" ambiguity as follows: 
As explained by Francis Bacon more than 400 years ago, an 
ambiguity is "patent" when it is recognized as an ambiguity 
just by reading the documents; it is latent when it is not 
recognized as an ambiguity until you know something outside 
the contract. Bacon, A Collection of Some Principal Rules 
and Maximes of the Common Law 90-91 (1597); Rossetto v. 
Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2000); Texas 
v. American Tobacco Co., 463 F.3d 399, 409 (5th Cir. 2006); 
Allegheny Int'l, Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 
1416, 1424 (3d Cir. 1994); 11 Williston on Contracts § 33:40 
(2007 Supp., 4th ed., Richard A. Lord ed.). A contract that 
provides for shipping cotton on the ship Peerless is not 
ambiguous on its face, but there is a latent ambiguity if there 
is more than one ship by that name to which the contract 
might (if all you know is what the contract says) refer. Raffles 
v. Wickelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864). 
A latent ambiguity thus presupposes that extrinsic evidence 
has been introduced - you need such evidence to establish the 
ambiguity. A patent ambiguity leaps out at the reader from 
the contract, and requires recourse to extrinsic evidence to 
dispel. University of Southern Indiana Foundation v. Baker, 
843 N.E.2d 528, 532-33 (Ind. 2006); Rossetto v. Pabst 
Brewing Co., supra, 217 F.3d at 543. 
Had Ford sometime between March 2002 and June 2005 not shortened the name of 
the GT40 to "GT," and had delivered to Henry Day Ford three GT40s, there would have 
been no ambiguity to resolve. The ambiguity arose when Ford changed the vehicle's 
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name. The change of name was a collateral matter about which a court, charged with 
determining what the parties meant by their reference to GT40 in March 2002, should 
know and consider. That the change of name occurred after March 2002 supports the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the ambiguity was "latent." Given the latent 
ambiguity, the trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence in construing what 
the parties meant by their reference to GT40 in March 2002, as did the Court of Appeals. 
4. The Inclusion in the Contracts of an Integration Clause does not bar 
consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning that the parties ascribed to 
the term "GT40." 
Henry Day argued to the trial court, to the Court of Appeals, and argues again on 
certiorari that "an integrated agreement must be interpreted on its face . . . . " Petitioner's 
Brief, 39. Henry Day construes an integration clause as barring resort to extrinsic 
evidence to assist in the interpretation of terms used in the agreement. 
An integration clause restricts a party's ability to argue that its agreement includes 
additional terms not mentioned in a written agreement. The presence in a contract of an 
integration clause, however, does not preclude a court from considering extrinsic or parol 
evidence in order to interpret and determine the meaning of words and terms that are used 
in contract. See Hessler v. Crystal Lake Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 338 111. App 3d 1010, 
788 N.E. 2d 405, 413 (2003). According to Corbin: 
Even if a written document has been assented to as the complete and 
accurate integration of the terms of a contract, it must still be interpreted; 
and all those factors that are of assistance in this process may be proved by 
oral testimony. 
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6 Corbin on Contracts, § 579 (1979). Cantamar involved a promissory note/contract that 
the trial court concluded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, was an "integrated" 
agreement. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals took on the task of reviewing the trial 
court's interpretation of terms used in the integrated agreement, holding that "[w]hen 
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered." 
Cantamar, ]f26 (quoting Ward, 907 P.2d at 268) (emphasis in original). 
B. The Court of Appeals did not Err in Concluding that Watkins did not 
Waive or Abandon his Rights Under his Contracts with Henry Day Ford, 
1. "Waiver" and "Abandonment" at least as applied to contracts, are 
substantially the same affirmative defense. 
For the first time in this case, at trial or on appeal, Henry Day treats waiver and 
abandonment as if they are separate and distinct legal constructs. Compare and contrast 
Petitioner's Brief on certiorari, 11-27, to Appellee's Brief, 35-40; see also Defendant's 
Trial Brief. 
As concerns contract rights, it is not clear what is the difference between "waiver" 
of a contract right and "abandonment" of a contract right, if there is any difference at all. 
Early Utah cases, in fact, used the term "abandonment" to define "waiver." See e.g., 
O'Donnell v. Parker. 48 Utah 578, 160 P. 1192, 1194 (1916)(held, "A waiver is the 
intentional abandonment of a known right"); WooUey v. Loose, 57 Utah 336, 194 P. 908, 
912 (1920) ("waiver is the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a 
right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such 
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person forever be deprived of its benefit"); Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall 61 Utah 
223, 211 P. 991, 993 (1922) ("waiver is defined as the voluntary abandonment of some 
known right or advantage"). More recent Utah cases, including Soter's, the seminal Utah 
case on "waiver," define "waiver" as the intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n.. 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) 
(emphasis added). "To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Id.5 "The 
intent to relinquish a right must be distinct/9 Id. (emphasis added). 
At least two pre- Soter?s cases analyze the relinquishment or "giving up" of 
contract rights under the construct of "abandonment" without, though, distinguishing 
between "abandonment" and "waiver." Both cases, though, define "abandonment" in 
terms similar to how the Supreme Court in Soter's defined "waiver." See Timpanogos 
Highlands. Inc. v. Harper. 544 P.2d 481 (Utah 1975); Forsyth v. Pendleton. 617 P.2d 358 
(Utah 1980). Both decisions define "abandonment" to mean "the intentional 
relinquishment" of one's rights in the contract; and in order to nullify such rights, there 
must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such abandonment." Timpanogos. 484; 
Forsyth. 362 (emphasis added). In Forsyth, the Supreme Court added, "while the intent 
must be clear and unequivocal, that intention . . . may be inferred from the acts and 
5The quotation attributed to Soter's by Petitioner at page 18 of its Brief is 
incorrect. Perhaps the standard required to prove "abandonment," though, should be 
exactly the same as for "waiver." 
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conduct of the purchaser, which are clearly inconsistent with an intention to continue the 
use of the property." Forsyth, 361 (emphasis added). 
Both lines of cases, thus, speak to an "intentional relinquishment" of a contract 
right. Both incorporate and state similarly rigorous requirements for proving a waiver or 
abandonment of a contract right. 
The burden to prove "abandonment" of a contract does not involve a substantially 
different or less rigorous standard of proof than does "waiver," as Henry Day Ford seems 
to imply in its present Brief - by presenting and arguing "abandonment" and "waiver" as 
separate and distinct affirmative defenses. 
2. The Court of Appeals correctly identified and applied Utah law on 
Waiver and Abandonment. 
The Court of Appeals correctly identified the applicable law in concluding that, 
"There is simply no intentional relinquishment of a known right in this case." Watkins, 
TJ17 (emphasis in original): 
The trial court determined that Watkins had abandoned the contracts 
and waived his rights thereunder by his acceptance of Henry Day's 
return of the deposit. Waiver and abandonment involve the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. See Soter 's Inc. v. 
Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 857 P. 2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) 
("A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To 
constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it. We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right 
must be distinct." (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P. 2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) ("Abandonment means the intentional relinquishment of 
one's rights in the contract" and in order to nullify such rights, there 
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must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such abandonment"). 
There is simply no intentional relinquishment of a known right in this 
case. 
Watkms, [^17. Although the Court of Appeals cited one of its own cases as governing 
authority on "abandonment," Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App 
1988), Lucky Seven adopted and quoted verbatim the definition of "abandonment" of 
contract rights articulated by the Supreme Court in Timpanogos, at 484. Henry Day Ford, 
in its current Brief, does not contend that the Court of Appeals identified and applied the 
wrong law. Nor does it argue that Soter's, or Timpanogos and Lucky Seven should be 
overturned or modified. 
The Court of Appeals furthermore correctly recognized that both "waiver" and 
"abandonment" involve mixed questions of law and fact. Accordingly, it correctly noted 
that the applicable standards of review required it to give the trial court's factual 
determinations deference, and that it should not reverse the trial court's conclusions on 
abandonment and waiver unless persuaded by Watkins that "the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the [trial court's] findings": 
"Where there is dispute as to whether [abandonment] has occurred, 
it is usually a question of fact, to be determined from the 
circumstances of the particular case . . ." Timpanogos Highlands 
Inc. v. Harper, 544 P. 2d 481, 484 (Utah 1975)(footnote omitted). 
Thus, "we do not reverse unless we are persuaded that the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings." Id. Likewise, "the 
actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature 
and should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which we give 
a district court deference." Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, P 16, 
982 P.2d 572. 
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Watkins, [^10. Where a trial court's conclusion of law involves a mixed question of law 
and fact, an appellant must "first marshal all evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 
^76, 100 P.3d 1177. Watkins, in his Brief to the Court of Appeals, acknowledged his 
duty to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact, Appellant's 
Brief, 33, and did so, kL, 33-36. Henry Day does not contend in its current Brief that 
Watkins failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. 
On the basis of the evidence as marshaled by Watkins on appeal, and according 
deference to the trial court's findings, the Court of Appeals concluded that, "there is 
simply no intentional relinquishment of a known right in this case." Watkins, [^17. In 
coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals implicitly was persuaded that the 
evidence, as marshaled, "clearly preponderates against the findings." Id. 
3. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the evidence did not 
establish "an intentional relinquishment of a known [contractual] right," especially given 
that Watkins' right to purchase the GT40s/GTs was subject to a condition precedent, and 
given Henry Day Ford's representation to Watkins by letter dated December 31, 2002. 
"Waiver" and "abandonment" both are affirmative defenses. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). 
Having raised "waiver" and "abandonment" as defenses, it was Henry Day Ford's 
burden at trial to prove the defenses. McCornick v. Sadler, 11 Utah 444, 40 P. 711, 712 
(Utah 1895). 
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As Soter's held, "a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right." 
Soter's, 942. "To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Id. 
(emphasis added). "We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right must be 
distinct." Id. " A distinct intent to waive must . . . be shown by a preponderence of the 
evidence." Soter's, 942 n.6.6 
According to American Jurisprudence (Am.Jur.2d): 
Waiver is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has 
knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must 
generally be shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person 
6Proof of waiver, under the standard established by Soter's, requires that the party 
which contends another party has waived his rights, must prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the conduct of the other manifested a distinct intent - not just an intent 
- to waive his rights. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Soter's, 
We recognize that there is an inherent contradiction 
between requiring "distinct" intent while permitting it to 
be established by a preponderance only. It might make the 
matter clearer if the burden of persuasion on intent were 
"clear and convincing," as some jurisdictions require for 
waiver or estoppel, see, e.g.,[citations omitted] (estoppel), and 
the "distinct" requirement were dropped. We have no 
occasion, however, to consider that matter today. 
Soter's, 942 n.6 (emphasis added). Watkins submits that the better rule of proof 
necessary to prove waiver would be proof by clear and convincing evidence. At the very 
least, a "clear and convincing" standard that would be easier to comprehend and explain. 
The Court of Appeals, though, did not err in applying the "distinct intent" proof 
requirement articulated by Soter's, in concluding that the evidence at trial did not prove 
Watkins' intention to relinquish a known right. 
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against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual 
or constructive, of the existence of the party's rights or of all material 
facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a 
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of 
a material fact negates wavier, and waiver cannot be established by a 
. . . misapprehension of fact. 
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that 
person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon 
which to make an intelligent decision. Waiver requires a knowledge 
of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an 
awareness of its consequences. 
28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §202 (2000). 
A waiver of a known right "must be distinctly made, although it may be express or 
implied." Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Utah 1978). Although an intent to 
waive rights may be implied, the "general principle in our case law [is] that '[m]ere 
silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation to speak.'" Id., 940; 
Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1998). "Although [an intent to relinquish a 
right] may be express or implied [Soters at 941], it 'will not be implied from doubtful 
acts.'" Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 2003 UT 51, ^84, 82 P.3d 1076 (quoting 28 Am.Jur.2d 
Estoppel and Waiver §160 at 845 (1966)). "When waiver is to be implied from conduct, 
the acts, conduct, or circumstances relied upon to show waiver must make out a clear 
case." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver §290 at 706 ( 2008). "Waiver will not be inferred 
from slight circumstances or on slight proof, and is not to be lightly inferred in the face of 
a clearly expressed intention to insist on the right alleged to have been waived." Id. at 
705. Similarly, "abandonment," to the extent that it is a legal construct distinguishable 
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from "waiver," means the intentional relinquishment of one's rights in the contract; and in 
order to nullify such rights, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such an 
abandonment." Timpanogos, 484. 
Henry Day Ford's argument on certiorari is that the evidence at trial proved that 
Watkins distinctly intended to relinquish his contractual right to purchase up to two Ford 
GT40s (or "GTs" as they were later called) should Ford Motor Company allocate to 
Henry Day at a future date at least one GT40/GT. It repeats the argument it made to the 
Court of Appeals. Its argument seems to be based on two grounds: (1) that Watkins' 
negotiation without protest of Henry Day's check for $2000, and (2) that Watkins' silence 
over the next 2 !4 years (until he demanded that Henry Day Ford sell him the Ford GT it 
had recently been allocated)7 "distinctly" or "unequivocally" revealed Watkins' intention 
to relinquish his contract rights. 
The principal event on which Henry Day bases its claim of waiver, as implied by 
Watkins' conduct, is Watkins' act of cashing the check for $2,000 that Henry Day mailed 
to him on December 31, 2002. What Henry Day wants to gloss over, or bury entirely, is 
the misleading and untrue statement in its letter that accompanied the check, in which it 
said: 
We regret to inform you that our allocation is not going to 
allow us to receive this vehicle. 
7
 A 2005 white Ford GT coupe which Henry Day Ford's owner, Mike Ford, kept 
for his own use. 
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This statement, according to the Court of Appeals: 
. . .was an unequivocal representation by Henry Day that its prior 
uncertainty regarding allocation had been resolved and that it now knew it 
would not be receiving any of the subject cars. Had this representation 
been true, then the parties would have known that a condition precedent to 
the contracts was definitely not going to happen and they therefore would 
no longer have had any rights or obligations under the contracts. See 
Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc., 1999 UT 34, P14, 976, P.2d 1213 
("Under well-established principles of contract interpretation, where the 
duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon the occurrence or 
existence of a condition precedent, the obligee may not require performance 
by the obligor, because the obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's 
right to demand performance, does not arise until that condition occurs or 
exists. Failure of a material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any 
duty to perform." (citation omitted)). 
Watkins, f l8 (emphasis in original). By informing Watkins that it would not be 
allocated and would not receive any such vehicles, Henry Day in effect advised Watkins 
that the condition precedent, on which their mutual obligations were based, would not 
occur. Watkins had no reason, given the certainty of Henry Day's statement, to believe 
that Ford might nonetheless allocate one or more GT40s (to which Henry Day referred to 
as "this vehicle") to Henry Day; and, thus, that he retained an unextinguished right to buy 
a Ford GT40/GT from Henry Day at a future date. As the Court of Appeals concluded, 
"There is simply no evidence whatsoever indicating that Watkins knew he still had rights 
under the Contracts at the time he negotiated the check concerning his deposit." 
Watkins, [^18. On certiorari, Henry Day argues that this is not true, that other Ford 
dealers had told Watkins, when he talked to them, that allocations were uncertain and 
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might be tied to awards issued by Ford Motor Co. Petitioner's Brief, 20. This, though, 
confirms Watkins' and Henry Day's initial understanding, when the Contracts were 
signed, that an allocation to Henry Day was not assured. Watkins Tr. 45:15-18; see also 
Findings of Fact, 8, 9, 18. In its letter dated December 31, 2002, however, Henry Day 
unequivocally informed Watkins that, "our allocation is not going to allow us to receive 
this vehicle." 
Henry Day faults Watkins because he, having received its letter and its check, 
negotiated its check "without objection or inquiry about the status of the President's 
Award." Petitioner's Brief, 20. But what reason did Watkins have to object or 
complain if Ford Motor Company, whatever its basis or reason, had determined not to 
allocate any GT40s (or GTs) to Henry Day? The only reason Watkins would have had to 
inquire about the President's Award and Henry Day's probability of earning it, would be 
if he disbelieved Henry Day's assurance that it would not be allocated "this vehicle." As 
the Court of Appeals stated, "We . . . can conceive of no policy reason requiring Watkins 
to distrust Henry Day's representation." Watkins, ^fl9. It could similarly conceive of no 
reason why Watkins had a duty to object or protest, given the information transmitted by 
Henry Day's December 31, 2002 letter. Id- The Court of Appeals held: 
There was nothing that would have given Watkins any reason 
to doubt the accuracy or truth of the information relayed by 
Henry Day. And the crucial information regarding 
nonoccurrence of the condition precedent is something that 
Watkins had no way of independently verifying. Under these 
circumstances, there was simply no relinquishment by 
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Watkins of a known right, and we reverse the trial court on 
this issue. 
Watkins, |^19, Henry Day, on certiorari, protests that the Court of Appeal's conclusion is 
not correct, that "as noted, Watkins, an experienced car dealer, had the means to 
independently verify the information in the letter which accompanied the return of his 
deposit." Petitioner's Brief at 16. But how? By what means? Watkins is not a Ford 
dealer, as such, he would have no means to check on Ford Motor Company's internal 
plans to allocate limited production vehicles to its dealers. 
Henry Day, on certiorari, also argues that Watkins' silence between December 31, 
2002 and June 2005 proves that he intentionally waived or abandoned his known right to 
purchase a GT for MSRP. However, the date for performance under the Contracts was 
not the date of the Contracts; but was the date on which Henry Day ordered its first GT -
which it could order only if Ford Motor Co. allocated to it one or more GTs. Watkins 
thus had no right demand performance by Henry Day until maybe December 2004, which 
is when Ford Motor Co. invoiced Henry Day for a 2005 Ford GT Coupe, which Henry 
Day Ford testified at trial was not delivered to it until May 31, 2005.8 See Finding of 
Fact No. 32. "[A] person cannot waive a right before he or she is in a position to assert 
it." 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §201 (2000). On discovering that Ford had in fact 
8Watkins' right may have accrued at an earlier date, if Henry Day placed its order 
for a GT earlier than December 2004. 
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allocated and delivered to Henry Day a GT, notwithstanding Henry Day's statement in its 
earlier letter dated December 31, 2002, Watkins immediately presented himself at Henry 
Day Ford, and demanded it sell to him the GT it had received. Watkins did not sit on his 
rights once he learned Henry Day had been allocated and had received a GT. He acted 
and demanded performance immediately once he learned that the condition precedent on 
which his rights depended had occurred. Neither abandonment nor waiver, thus, can be 
inferred by Watkins' alleged "delay" in demanding that Henry Day sell him a Ford GT. 
The Court of Appeals was therefore correct in overruling the trial court's Finding of Fact 
No. 41. 
Troubling to Watkins is Henry Day's continuing assertion that "Watkins, as an 
experienced automobile dealer, knew his rights under the Contracts, and clearly 
demonstrated his intention to relinquish those rights when he negotiated the $2,000.00 
check." Petitioner's Brief at 26. This is a nice-sounding, but general and substantively 
meaningless statement. What "rights" did Watkins know he had? Did he have special 
rights known to him, solely because he is an owner of a motor vehicle dealership? What 
rights," allegedly known to Watkins, did he, as an "experienced automobile dealer," 
knowingly relinquish? What special knowledge did he have, as an experienced dealer, 
that demonstrated his distinct intention to relinquish [his] rights when he negotiated 
Henry Day's check? Why would Watkins' negotiation of the check evidence a waiver of 
his rights, given Henry Day's advice that "its allocation [was] not going to allow [it] to 
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receive this vehicle?" Why is it that Watkins, who is not a Ford dealer, should have 
known better than to believe Henry Day's statement that Ford Motor Co. was not going to 
allocate it to any Ford GT40s? These are questions for which Watkins, at least, does not 
know the answers. 
A distinct intention by Watkins to waive a known legal right cannot be inferred 
based on his act of cashing Henry Day's check and his silence over the next 2 lA years. 
Although a waiver can be implied from a party's conduct, "it will not be implied from 
doubtful acts." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals. 2003 UT 51, |84, 82 P.3d 1076. "When waiver 
is to be implied from conduct, the acts, conduct or circumstances relied upon to show 
waiver must make out a clear case." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 290 at 706 (2008). 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated and emphasized in Soter's, the "totality of 
circumstances" must indicate and establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a distinct 
intention by a person to relinquish a legal right that the person knows he has. Soter's, 942. 
Watkins' conduct, in cashing Henry Day's check (based on the letter he received) 
and otherwise, does not prove his distinct intention to waive a right known to him. 
Watkins' act of cashing Henry Day's check establishes only his belief and assumption 
that Henry Day was being forthright and accurate when it informed him that Ford Motor 
Co. would not be allocating to Henry Day the vehicle/model which Henry Day had 
contracted to sell to him. The Court of Appeals therefore did not err in concluding that the 
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evidence, as marshaled on appeal, did not support the trial court's conclusion that 
Watkins had waived or abandoned his rights under his Contracts. 
4. Henry Day Ford may not claim that Watkins waived his contract rights 
where its false representation was the foundation for Watkins' alleged waiver. 
By way of a footnote, the Court of Appeals stated and concluded as follows: 
The trial court made a finding that Henry Day "returned 
[Watkins]'s check in good faith and based upon the 
reasonable belief they would not be allotted any Ford GT 
40's." But whether Henry Day was acting in good faith by 
making an educated guess is irrelevant - it does not change 
the information actually given to Watkins, which information 
tells us whether Watkins was relinquishing a known right. 
Further, notwithstanding any good faith, the unequivocal 
statement from Henry Day was simply incorrect. See 
generally 31 CJ.S. Estoppel & Waiver § 218 (2008). ("A 
waiver may not be claimed by one whose false representation 
is the foundation of the waiver." Henry Day knew that there 
existed some possibility, no matter how slim, that Henry Day 
would get one of the subject cars"). 
Watkins, 1J19 n.7. Despite its knowledge, Henry Day told Watkins it would not be getting 
any of the subject cars. 
"A waiver may not be claimed by one whose false representation is the foundation 
of the waiver." 31 CJ.S. Estoppel & Waiver. §218 (2008); see also, Home Ins. Co. v. 
Thunderbird Inc., 338 So.2d 391 (Miss. 1976). Henry Day does not, on certiorari, 
challenge the Court of Appeals' statement of the law on this issue, nor its application in 
this case. 
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5. Henry Day Ford did not at trial prove that it was prejudiced by Watkins' 
demand in June 2005 that it sell to him the two Ford GTs it had been allocated. 
In cases where contractual obligations are involved, the Utah Supreme Court has 
added to the elements that it held, in Soter's, must be proven to establish waiver. Thus, 
"waiver of a contractual right occurs when a party to the contract intentionally acts in a 
manner inconsistent with its contractual rights, and, as a result, prejudice accrues to the 
opposing party or parties to the contract." Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, 
Inc.. 2009 UT 43, T[17, 216 P.3d 352 (emphasis added); Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, p i , 
71 P.3d 589. Henry Day disclosed to the trial court this additional element. R. 568. 
Henry Day, though, did not at trial prove that it was prejudiced by Watkins' supposed 
"waiver" of his contractual rights. The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions 
of law that address the issue of prejudice attributable to conduct by Watkins that is 
alleged to have been inconsistent with his contractual rights. Watkins on appeal raised 
the issue of prejudice, Appellant's Brief at 42-43, but the Court of Appeals did not 
address it. 
The requirement that a person who claims that another has waived his contractual 
rights must prove prejudice, coincides with the legal principle that "a waiver can be 
retracted at any time before the other party has materially changed position in reliance on 
the waiver." 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §200 at 605 (2000); see also Max 327, 
Inc. v. City of Portland, 115 Or. App. 342, 838 P.2d 631, 633 (1992), review denied, 846 
P.2d 1161 (Or. 1993). At least in the case of the white 2005 Ford GT Coupe, Henry Day 
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cannot maintain it was prejudiced by Watkins' demand that it sell him the vehicle for 
MSRP, as Henry Day's owner retained the vehicle for his personal use. As the second 
GT was not delivered to Henry Day until July, 2005, or sometime thereafter, Watkins' 
demand in early June, 2005 that Henry Day sell to him the second GT (which would 
amount to a repudiation of his alleged waiver), was made prior to Henry Day incurring 
any prejudice in reliance on the earlier "waiver" of rights that it presumed. 
6. Henry Day Ford has waived its right to argue Mutual Abandonment of 
the Contracts. 
For the first time in this case, Henry Day argues the defense of "mutual 
abandonment." Petitioner's Brief at 16-18. Specifically, Henry Day argues that "the 
parties' actions of mutual abandonment of the Contracts in this case amount to a 
manifestation of mutual assent to rescind the contracts." Id at 17. The Supreme Court 
in Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 1980), did state that, "when the intent to 
abandon by one party is coupled with the equal intention of the other party, such mutual 
abandonment may under certain circumstances, be found to constitute rescission of the 
contract." The Supreme Court in Forsyth, however, declined to address the claim of 
"mutual abandonment" and rescission of contract because its "review of the pleadings and 
record [in Forsyth] discloses no claim of rescission and accordingly the Court refrains 
from commenting further with reference to this case." Id. Similarly, Henry Day's 
Answer does not plead "mutual abandonment" or rescission of contracts as an affirmative 
defense. Therefore, Henry Day has waived this defense. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). Henry 
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Day, furthermore, has not previously argued mutual abandonment/rescission as a separate 
defense. 
C. The Court of Appeals did not err in Holding that Henry Day Ford 
Breached its Contracts with Watkins. 
Henry Day did not, in its petition for writ of certiorari, ask the Supreme Court to 
review this issue. The holding that Henry Day breached the Contracts, though, is the 
logical consequence of its holdings on contract interpretation and waiver/abandonment. 
Henry Day's argument on "reasonable time to perform," though, is a new argument not 
before raised, which goes beyond the issues that Henry Day asked the Supreme Court to 
review. It also ignores that the parties' agreement was tied to a condition precedent. Its 
argument on "meeting of the minds" is also a new argument not before raised. 
D. The Court of Appeals did not err in its Ruling on Mitigation of Damages. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence before it was insufficient for it to 
determine if Watkins failed to mitigate his damages, and determine that this defense could 
be reconsidered by the trial court on remand. Indeed, the trial court did not reach the 
question of damages. 
The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 39, that Watkins failed to mitigate his 
damages, amounts to a conclusion of law which should be accorded no deference by a 
court of appeal. The factual basis of the argument is that Watkins declined a post-
complaint offer by Henry Day to sell to Watkins the third GT it received for MSRP. The 
offer was made after the market value of GTs had dropped significantly. 
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In Mallek v. City of San Benito. 121 F.3d 993 ( 5th Cir. 1997), the city based its 
motion for summary judgment, in part, on plaintiffs alleged failure to mitigate his 
damages by refusing to accept the City's offer of employment. In rejecting this argument, 
the 5th Circuit held that a duty to mitigate damages "does not include the duty to accept a 
new and different bargain with terms less favorable than those to which [a party] had 
previously agreed." Id., 997. Watkins, after this lawsuit was filed, was not required to 
abandon his remedy for damages measured at the time of Henry Day's breach and accept 
Henry Day's belated offer to sell him a Ford GT at MSRP on penalty that his rejection of 
the offer would be deemed a failure to mitigate his damages. 
E. The Court of Appeals did not Err in Awarding Watkins his Attorneys 
Fees on Appeal. 
Attorneys fees in this matter is a function of who prevails on the breach of contract 
claim, as the Contracts include an attorneys fee provision. If Henry Day breached the 
contracts, then Watkins is entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys fees, including his 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred on appeal. If the Supreme Court affirms the Court of 
Appeals' Decision, then Henry Day is obviously not entitled to recover its attorneys fees 
and costs on appeal. If the Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals and reinstates 
the judgment of the trial court, then Henry Day Ford should be entitled to recover its 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred on appeal. 
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VIII. REQUESTED RELIEF 
Tom Watkins requests that the Supreme Court affirm the Decision by the Court of 
Appeals in its entirety. 
DATED this (O ""day of June, 2011. CO 
By_^/ 
P. Bryan Fishburn 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF was mailed in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, on the y- day 
of June, 2011, to the following: 
Robert W. Hughes, Esq. 
438 E. 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner, Henry Day Ford 
P. Bryan fishburn 
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Addendum A 
Ed —«Lwflfi F iff 
12-31-2002 
DEAR SIR, 
ENCLOSED PLEASE FIND A CHECK FOR THE REFUND OF DEPOSIT ON 
YOUR VEHICLE ORDER. WE REGRET TO INFORM YOU THAT OUR 
ALLOCATION IS NOT GOING TO ALLOW US TO RECEIVE THIS VEHICLE. 
ME APOLOGIZE FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE THIS HAS CAUSED YOU. 
INEHARDJ 
>FFICE MANACEER 
[ENRY DAY FORD, INC. 
S South Redwood Road 
: Lake City, utan S4Vi5 
.973.7030 Fax 801.972.0409 
v.henrydayford.com 
Your Day at Henry Day Ford" 
wHmMMezmHmmm+mm** mmt*mmim4m>4!A'i!k 
HENRY DAY FORD, IMC* 
38SS SamfREOWOO0ROAO 
SALT LAKE CfTX UTAH B*1-*9 
(8Q1) 973*7&& 
PAY 
*JV,'G TH0USANOvDOJi.L^^^yt> 00 /100** 
TO THE 
ORDER TOM WATKIMS 
Of 2537 EASTJ82O0 SOUTH -
S AtT LAKE CITY UT ©4121 
UlllUiMMlMnrtataR 
213Z SOUTH 13CQEJS? 
51-73^240 
•QAF5, 
12/30/152 
ET.1 AMOUNT 
$2,000.00 
u -0OO&7Sia« «: I 2 1 , 0 0 0 73 7*3 *<M3& 7 0 0 7 ^ 5 2 * /DODO eoaoao/ I J yntfu*«m • ijii a j i ii i fiM-™ 
JG S«ajrt<r «*nrtJO*, Mfi. «0O W - ^ f 7 
Addendum B 
« BACK TD FEATURED AFTTICUSS 
FEATURE A R T I C L E S 
From Concept to Production: GT40 to Ford GT 
NOTIFY hAB WHEN E m 
UPDATED: 
jEnter email address 
Jun03 
Designing a GT40 concept car to 
celebrate Ford's centennial was a 
great idea. But even gutsier was 
the decision to the take the giant 
step and design the street-legal 
Ford GT. 
[June 2003] The Ford GT40 concept car, unveiled to universal acclaim at the 
2002 North American International Auto Show, was part of a Living Legends 
line of concept and production cars that included such venerable marques as 
Thunderbird, Mustang, and the Forth-Nine concept. 
"GT40 is the ultimate Living Legend," said 3 Mays, Ford vice president of 
Design. "It's a true supercar with appeal equal to that of the greatest sports 
cars in the world, but with the addition of a heritage no cne can match. 
Essential elements of the original, including the stunning low profile and mid-
mounted American V8, continue in this latest interpretation of the classic." 
The GT40 concent bears a resemblance to the low, sleek silhouette of the 
original but nothing more. In every dimension, every curve and nut and bolt, 
it's a purely modern interpretation. 
For those unfamiliar with the story, the Ford GT40 dethroned Italian 
automaker Ferrari at the 1966 24 Hours of Le Mans, the most prestigious of 
all international racing events. Until then, Ferrari had pretty much owned Le 
Mans, having won the title the six previous years. Ford went on to win again 
in 1967, this time by the Shelby-American team in a GT40 Mark IV driven by 
Americans AJ. Foyt and Dan Gurney. A Ford GT40 won again in 1968 and 
1969. 
Search for and purchas« 
models, posters, shirts 
exclusive Ford GT mere 
F O R D GT M&FLOHA1 
Ford's domination at Le Mans over those glory years in the 1960s is itself a 
fascinating chapter in the history of international endurance racing. But 
perhaps even more interesting is that Ford accomplished this amazing feat in 
just over a few short years of planning and development. 
I f you want to achieve something badly enough, you go for it with everything 
you've got. That's what Ford Chairman Henry Ford I I did with his "Total 
Performance" campaign. The whole GT40 story, the determination to 
surmount overwhelming odds and become the best, can be summer •>:• 
Single rour-ie'crer word - QUCSI 
It's easy to understand why the Ford GT was chosen to represent the pride of 
the Ford Motor Company in its 100th year of putting the world on wheels. 
"The GT40 concent should do three things go fast handle exceptionally and 
look great," said Chris Theodore, then Ford's vice president of North America 
Product Development. "To be true to its Ford heritage, we had to create a 
supercar that would be uniquely a Ford. Anyone can do technology 
showpieces, high-displacement engines and modernistic designs, but there's 
much more to a GT40. There's heritage and heart. We think this car remains 
true to the spirit of its predecessors/' 
The Ford GT40 concept was a beautiful design, but how about an actual 
production model? Tnat would be even grander. So thought Ford CEO William 
Clay Ford, Jr. when he heard wave after enthusiastic wave of thunderous 
approval at the 2002 North American International Auto Show. And so it 
would be. 
Miraculously, the job of bringing the GT40 from concept car to production 
would have to be accomplished in just 16 months,, in time for the centennial 
celebration in June 2003= 
Johi i Coletti, director of S'VT Programs, assembled a Dream Team of designers 
and engineers to take the brainchild of J Mays and Chris Theodore and make 
it street legal. Making extensive use of computer models, they accomplished 
in about three months time what is usually done in the First nine months, and 
relied on 90 percent fewer prototype builds than normal 
Equipped with the latest in computer design technology and drawing on 
limitless reserves of enthi isiasm, the Ford GT team made the impossible 
possible. 
If oi ily Henry I I could have been here to watch the For d GT parade 
commemorating the lOOtl t Anniversary of the company, he'd have been 
mighty proud indeed. 
-&» T O P 
All vehicle images showi I at e ei11 iei 1 i istoi icaI, Coi icep 1: ::)i Pi e pi oduc 1:ion. 
Contact Us Privacy © 2003 Ford Motor Company 
